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OPINION 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 William Davenport appeals an order of the District 
Court denying his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his 
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Davenport claims his trial 
counsel was ineffective when he failed to argue that the 
Government had breached Davenport’s plea agreement. 
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Because we agree with the District Court that the plea 
agreement was not breached, we will affirm.1  
I 
A 
 On September 1, 2008, Drug Enforcement 
Administration agents executed a search warrant on a storage 
facility that Davenport controlled in Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania. Once inside, the agents found large amounts of 
drug paraphernalia and cash as well as approximately 160 
grams of cocaine. The facility also housed three vehicles, 
including a Cadillac that contained a loaded nine-millimeter 
pistol stashed between its seat cushions.  
 Several weeks later, DEA agents executed another 
search warrant, this time on Davenport’s residence in Enola, 
Pennsylvania. Davenport was present during this second 
search and agreed to cooperate. He was taken back to the 
DEA’s office, where he described his involvement with 
specific individuals in the drug trafficking business and 
admitted that he had purchased cocaine hydrochloride, 
cooked it into crack cocaine, and sold it. Davenport also 
admitted that the gun in the Cadillac was his.  
B 
 Following the searches, Davenport and five others 
were charged with several drug-related offenses. After 
initially pleading not guilty, Davenport signed a plea 
agreement in which he waived indictment and pleaded guilty 
                                                 
1 The Court acknowledges the excellent advocacy of 
pro bono counsel, J. Nicholas Ranjan of K&L Gates LLP, on 
behalf of Mr. Davenport. 
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to a superseding information charging him with one count of 
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 
cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  
 The plea agreement addressed, among other things, 
what recommendations the parties could make at sentencing. 
For example, Paragraph 12 stated that the Government would 
seek a three-level reduction in Davenport’s offense level if he 
accepted responsibility. Paragraph 13 permitted the 
Government to recommend a sentence it deemed appropriate, 
up to and including the maximum allowable by law. 
Likewise, Paragraph 26 stated that the Government could 
raise—and the sentencing court could consider—“all relevant 
information with respect to the defendant’s background, 
character and conduct including the conduct that is the subject 
of the charges which the United States has agreed to 
dismiss[.]” Rec. No. 178, at 16–17.2 And Paragraph 38 stated 
that the Government was not restricted in any way from 
responding to motions filed by Davenport or requests made 
by the sentencing court about how the Guidelines should be 
applied, “including but not limited to, requests for 
information concerning possible sentencing departures.” Rec. 
No. 178, at 23. 
 Most important for this appeal, however, is Paragraph 
14, which listed several specific recommendations as to how 
the Guidelines should be applied to Davenport’s conduct. 
Therein, the parties initially agreed to recommend: 
that the quantity of cocaine hydrochloride 
attributable to the defendant is 15-50 kilos, the 
                                                 
2 Davenport proceeded on the original record. Thus, all 
references to “Rec. No., at __” are to record entries in the 
district court docket. 
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quantity of crack cocaine attributable to the 
defendant is between 500 grams and 1.5 
kilograms, the defendant obstructed or impeded 
or attempted to obstruct or impede the 
administration of justice with respect to the 
investigation or prosecution of the offense, and 
the defendant possessed a firearm. 
 
Rec. No. 178, at 8–9 (emphasis added). Paragraph 14 then 
stated that Davenport “understands that none of these 
recommendations is binding” on the U.S. Probation Office or 
the sentencing court, either of which could arrive at different 
findings, and that the Government fully intended to provide 
“all information in its possession which it deems relevant to 
the application of the [Guidelines] to the defendant’s 
conduct.” Rec. No. 178, at 9. 
 At some point during the plea negotiations, the clause 
“and the defendant possessed a firearm” was stricken from 
Paragraph 14 and the initials “WD” and “RLM” (presumably 
“William Davenport” and his trial counsel, “Royce L. 
Morris”) were handwritten next to the deletion.3 Davenport 
argues that the stricken provision precluded the Government 
from pursuing a gun enhancement at sentencing. The 
Government counters that the strike-through meant nothing 
                                                 
3 The record does not indicate when this was done. 
Also, Davenport says his counsel and the Government 
initialed the stricken provision, Davenport Br. 4, whereas the 
Government claims Davenport and his counsel initialed the 
provision, Gov’t Br. 7. These ambiguities are immaterial to 
the outcome of this case. 
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more than that Davenport no longer stipulated to possession 
of a firearm.  
 At a change-of-plea hearing, Davenport affirmed that 
he read and understood the plea agreement, and the 
Government summarized the specific provisions in 
Paragraphs 12 and 14. The Government made no mention of 
the gun enhancement during its recital of Paragraph 14, but it 
did state that a loaded gun had been found during the search 
of Davenport’s storage facility. Davenport admitted the facts 
presented, and the District Court accepted his plea of guilty. 
C 
 The U.S. Probation Office calculated Davenport’s 
Total Offense Level at 35, which included a two-level 
enhancement under United States Sentencing Guidelines 
(USSG) § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possessing a firearm in connection 
with his offense and another two-level enhancement under 
USSG § 3C1.1 for obstructing justice. Davenport’s Criminal 
History Category was IV, which yielded a Guidelines range 
of 235 to 240 months’ imprisonment in light of the statutory 
maximum of 20 years. Davenport raised eight objections to 
the PSR.  
During Davenport’s sentencing hearing, the 
Government stated that there was “the issue of whether the 
gun enhancement should apply.” Rec. No. 313, at 2. 
Consequently, the Government called a DEA agent to 
respond to Davenport’s objections to the gun and obstruction 
of justice enhancements. After the DEA agent and another 
witness testified, the District Court invited Davenport’s trial 
counsel to argue that there was insufficient evidence to 
connect the firearm to the drug offense at issue. The Court 
then asked the prosecutor to reply, and she stated: “The area 
where the gun, loaded gun[,] was located was accessible from 
the same area where the drugs were located. I think the 
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circumstances under which the gun was possessed can be 
taken into consideration by the court.” Rec. No. 313, at 49–
50.  
The District Court rejected Davenport’s objections to 
the PSR, but varied downward and sentenced him to 199 
months’ imprisonment. Davenport appealed his sentence and 
we affirmed. See United States v. Davenport, 422 F. App’x 
115 (3d Cir. 2011). 
D 
 On July 3, 2012, Davenport filed a pro se motion to 
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 
2255. The District Court denied the motion, holding that the 
stricken clause in the plea agreement meant merely that 
Davenport no longer stipulated to a gun enhancement, not 
that the Government had waived the right to advocate for the 
enhancement at sentencing. Accordingly, because the 
Government had not breached the plea agreement, 
Davenport’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
argue that it had.  
 Davenport appealed and we granted a certificate of 
appealability on the question whether Davenport’s trial 
counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to the 
Government’s pursuit of a two-level gun enhancement in 
alleged violation of the terms of his plea agreement.4  
II 
 We exercise plenary review over the legal component 
of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. United States v. 
                                                 
4 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
over Davenport’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his 
sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We have jurisdiction 
over his appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). 
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Smack, 347 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2003). We review the 
underlying facts for clear error, but exercise independent 
judgment on whether those facts, as found by the District 
Court, show that counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Id. 
(quoting United States v. Baird, 218 F.3d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 
2000)). 
III 
 The threshold question presented is whether the 
Government breached Davenport’s plea agreement when it 
urged the District Court to impose a two-level gun 
enhancement under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). We hold that it did 
not, so it necessarily follows that Davenport’s trial counsel 
was not ineffective for failing to object to a non-existent 
breach. 
A 
 We follow a three-step analysis in determining 
whether there has been a breach of a plea agreement. First, we 
identify the terms of the agreement and the government’s 
alleged improper conduct. Second, we determine whether the 
government has violated its obligations under that agreement. 
And if it has, we fashion the proper remedy. United States v. 
Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 235 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing 
United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1360 (3d Cir. 
1989)).  
 At the outset, we determine “whether the 
government’s conduct is inconsistent with what was 
reasonably understood by the defendant when entering the 
plea of guilty.” Id. at 236 (quoting United States v. 
Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 939 (3d Cir. 1992)). “Reasonably 
understood” is a “purely objective” standard governed by the 
common law of contract. United States v. Hodge, 412 F.3d 
479, 485–86 (3d Cir. 2005). Specifically, we look to the plain 
meaning of the plea agreement and eschew a “rigidly literal” 
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interpretation of it. Id. at 486. And we give the benefit of any 
doubt to the defendant, given the government’s “tremendous 
bargaining power” in negotiating such plea agreements, 
United States v. Schwartz, 511 F.3d 403, 405 (3d Cir. 2008), 
and the fact that the defendant, “by entering into the plea, 
surrenders a number of [his] constitutional rights,” Nolan-
Cooper, 155 F.3d at 236.  
Once the plea agreement has been made, the 
government does not have to endorse its terms 
“enthusiastically,” Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 941, but it is 
expected to “adhere strictly to the terms of the bargain it 
strikes,” Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d at 1361 (quoting United 
States v. Miller, 565 F.2d 1273, 1274 (3d Cir. 1977)), and we 
will hold the government to that bargain.  
B 
 Davenport argues that he reasonably expected that the 
Government would not pursue a gun enhancement based on 
the written terms of the plea agreement. We disagree. At the 
outset, we note that the extent to which the Government can 
be said to have advocated for an enhancement is itself 
debatable, given the fact that Davenport himself objected to 
the gun enhancement in the PSR, and the only time the 
Government addressed the issue at the sentencing hearing 
was when it was specifically asked to do so by the Court.  
 Davenport makes three arguments in support of his 
claim that the Government breached the plea agreement. 
First, he claims that because Paragraph 14 contains a set 
number of sentencing recommendations the Government 
would pursue, the removal of one of those 
recommendations—the gun enhancement—led him to 
reasonably believe that the Government would not advocate 
for it at sentencing. “Under the contractual interpretive canon 
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” he argues, “the 
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expression of these items necessarily excluded anything that 
was not listed, including the firearm enhancement.” 
Davenport Br. 14. He cites the Tenth Circuit’s decision in 
United States v. Scott, where, on his view, the Court was 
presented with “nearly identical facts” and held that the 
government had breached a plea agreement when it agreed to 
take specific positions at sentencing but then sought an 
unstated enhancement. 469 F.3d 1335, 1338 (10th Cir. 2006). 
Second, Davenport leans on two Texas Supreme Court 
decisions for the proposition that a stricken provision in a 
contract “can manifest an intent to preclude or an 
unwillingness to be bound.” Davenport Br. 17 (citing 
Houston Exploration Co. v. Wellington Underwriting 
Agencies, Ltd., 352 S.W.3d 462, 472 (Tex. 2011), and 
Houston Pipe Line Co. v. Dwyer, 374 S.W.2d 662, 664–66 
(Tex. 1964)). Finally, Davenport argues that at the very least 
the stricken provision created ambiguity, which should be 
resolved in his favor. Davenport Br. 18 (citing Schwartz, 511 
F.3d at 405). 
 Davenport’s arguments fail because, as we stated in 
Schwartz, plea agreements “must be interpreted as a whole 
and no part should be ignored.” 511 F.3d at 405 (quoting 
Calamari & Perillo, Contracts § 3.13 (5th ed. 2003)). While 
Davenport homes in on the first part of Paragraph 14, the rest 
of that paragraph makes clear that the Government reserved 
the right to provide the District Court and the Probation 
Office with “all information in its possession which it deems 
relevant.” Rec. No. 178, at 9. Meanwhile, Paragraphs 13, 26, 
and 38 all put Davenport on notice of the Government’s 
significant flexibility at sentencing to respond to both his 
objections and the District Court’s inquiries. The record 
shows that the Government raised the issue of the gun only in 
direct response to Davenport’s argument that there was 
 11 
 
insufficient evidence to connect the gun with his offense. 
Read as a whole, the plea agreement clearly permits this kind 
of advocacy.  
 The plea agreement also makes plain that Paragraph 14 
contained joint recommendations of the parties. 
Recommendations that the parties had not agreed to, or that 
they could unilaterally make or oppose, were not included in 
that list. Accordingly, the removal of the gun enhancement 
meant simply that the parties no longer jointly agreed on that 
specific recommendation. It did not, as Davenport claims, 
mean that the parties had jointly agreed that the Government 
would be barred from bringing the gun enhancement to the 
Court’s attention at sentencing. Davenport’s argument ignores 
the other provisions of the plea agreement that explicitly 
permit the Government to do just that.  
 Davenport’s argument also falls prey to the logical 
fallacy of the inverse—the incorrect assumption that if P 
implies Q, then not-P implies not-Q. See NLRB v. Noel 
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2603 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in judgment) (explaining the logical error); Ruggero J. 
Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers: A Guide to Clear Legal Thinking 
161 (3d ed. 1997) (same). Davenport essentially argues that 
striking the stipulation to the gun enhancement was 
tantamount to an agreement that he did not possess a firearm. 
He is incorrect. While striking the gun clause vitiated the 
recommendation, it did not tacitly impose the obverse 
recommendation. 
 Nor is Davenport’s reliance on the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision in Scott availing. The plea agreement in Scott 
delineated the “positions [the parties] expect to take at 
sentencing” and then articulated what those positions would 
be. Scott, 469 F.3d at 1338. The Tenth Circuit determined that 
the Government had breached the agreement because Scott 
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reasonably understood that language to mean the Government 
would not argue for other sentencing enhancements, but it did 
so anyway. Id. Here, the parties did not circumscribe the 
positions they were allowed to take at sentencing—a fact 
made evident when one reads the plea agreement as a whole, 
including the second half of Paragraph 14 and Paragraphs 13, 
26, and 38. Rather, the parties consented to a list of joint 
recommendations and agreed that the Government would 
have substantial flexibility to advocate positions at 
sentencing. 
IV 
Because the Government did not breach Davenport’s 
plea agreement, his trial counsel was not ineffective for 
failing to say there was a breach. The judgment of the District 
Court will be affirmed. 
